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FINDING THE SHOES THAT FIT: HOW DERIVATIVE
IS THE TRUSTEE'S POWER TO AVOID
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES UNDER SECTION
544(b) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE?
Alan N. Resnick*

ABSTRACT

Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which enables a
bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers that an actual unsecured creditor
could have avoided under state law, is a powerful tool most often used
to recover assets that were fraudulently transferredseveralyears before
a debtor's bankruptcy case. This power is often described aspermitting
the trustee, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and all of the
debtor's unsecured creditors, to "stand in the shoes" and assert the
rights of the particularunsecuredcreditor. In a recent case, In re Allou
Distributors, Inc., the Bankruptcy Courtfor the Eastern Districtof New
York held that a Chapter 7 trustee, acting under § 544(b), could avoid a
transfer of assets, if made by an insolvent debtor for less than fair
consideration, by relying on the rights of an actual unsecured creditor
that held a claim both on the date of the transfer and on the date of the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, even if the claim was not the
same on both dates and the earlier claim had been paid in full before
bankruptcy. This decision raises important questions regarding the
derivative nature of§ 544(b) and could have far-reachingimplications
with respect to the scope of a bankruptcy trustee's power to recover
fraudulently conveyed assets. The court's reasoning has the potential of
expanding the trustee'spowers beyond the power of any actual creditor
at the time of bankruptcy, thus departingfrom the derivative nature of§
544(b). At the same time, by not linking the trustee's powers under §
544(b) to the rights offuture creditors under applicablestatefraudulent
conveyance statutes, the decision has the potential of narrowing the
trustee's avoidance powers in certain situations. The Allou Distributors
decision and its potential application to other cases highlight the
importance of understanding the relationship offederal and state law,
the derivative nature of§ 544(b), and the provisions of applicable state
fraudulent conveyance statutes.
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INTRODUCTION

When a bankruptcy case is commenced, the Bankruptcy Code
gives the trustee certain rights and powers that enable the trustee to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the
debtor's unsecured creditors. For example, the Bankruptcy Code gives
the trustee the power to recover preferential payments made to creditors

on the eve of bankruptcy,' and to avoid unperfected security interests
and unrecorded real estate mortgages. 2 In a Chapter 11 case, these

rights and powers may be exercised by the debtor in possession. 3
One of the trustee's powers is based on § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which gives the trustee the power to avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, typically,
state law, by an actual, existing creditor holding an allowable unsecured
claim. 4 Consistent with the trustee's role in representing the interests of
unsecured creditors, this power enables the trustee to avoid a transfer of
property or an obligation that, in the absence of bankruptcy, at least one
of the debtor's actual unsecured creditors with a claim allowed in the
bankruptcy case could have avoided under applicable state or federal
law. 5 This power is derivative; the trustee has the power to avoid a
transfer or obligation under § 544(b) only if an actual creditor would
have had that right outside of bankruptcy. 6 When exercising its powers
under § 544(b), the trustee must identify that creditor or class of
creditors on whose rights the trustee is depending, sometimes referred to
'7
as the "triggering creditor."
* Alan N. Resnick is the Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professor of Bankruptcy Law at
Hofstra University School of Law and of counsel to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
LLP in New York City. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of Kalman
Ochs, special counsel, and Julia V. Smolyanskiy, associate, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson LLP.
1 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
2 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006).
3 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).
4 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2006); see also 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (on the allowance of claims).
5 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 544.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th
ed. 2009).
6 Id. at 544.02[2].
7 See, e.g., MC Asset Recovery, LLC v.S. Co., No. 06-0417, 2006 WL 5112612, at *3, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97034, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006) ("[I]n order to maintain an avoidance
action under § 544(b), a trustee must demonstrate the existence of a so-called 'golden' or
'triggering' creditor: (1)an unsecured creditor, (2) who holds an allowable unsecured claim under
section 502, and (3) who could avoid the transfers at issue under applicable (i.e., state) law.");
Schaps v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 58 B.R. 581, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("[A] prerequisite to a
Section 544(b) suit is the existence of an actual creditor holding an unsecured claim who could
have avoided the transfer under state law."), aff'd, 815 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1987); Young v.
Paramount Commc'ns Inc. (In re Wingspread Corp.), 178 BR. 938, 946 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)
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In addition to § 544(b) avoidance powers, the Bankruptcy Code
provides another avenue by which the trustee can recover fraudulently
conveyed property or avoid a fraudulent obligation. Under § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid a fraudulent conveyance or
obligation that was made or incurred within two years before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. 8 Unlike § 544(b), to use the
avoidance power under § 548, the trustee need not identify any actual
creditor that could have avoided the transfer outside of bankruptcy.
That is, the power to avoid a fraudulent conveyance under § 548 does
not derive from the power of any particular creditor of the debtor. In
fact, even if no actual creditor could have avoided the transfer outside of
bankruptcy at the time the case was commenced, the trustee nonetheless
can avoid the transfer under § 548.9 However, if a transfer was made or
obligation incurred more than two years before a bankruptcy filing, §
548 does not apply and the trustee has to rely on § 544(b).
A.

Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and State Fraudulent
Conveyance Laws

When the trustee relies on § 544(b) to avoid a fraudulent transfer
or obligation, he or she must base the avoidance action on state or
nonbankruptcy federal law that enables an unsecured creditor to avoid
such a transfer or obligation. 10 Most commonly, § 544(b) is used by
trustees to avoid transfers and obligations that are avoidable by creditors
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) l I or the Uniform
("Before a trustee is able to utilize applicable state or federal law referred to in Section 544(b),
there must be an allegation and ultimately a proof of the existence of at least one unsecured
creditor of the Debtor who at the time the transfer occurred, could have, under applicable local
law, attacked and set aside the transfer under consideration.") (quoting In re Smith, 120 B.R. 588,
590 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)). Some courts have held, however, that it is not necessary for the
trustee to identify the creditor by name in the complaint, although the trustee has the burden of
proof to demonstrate that such a creditor exists if challenged. See, e.g., Guiliano v. U.S. Nursing
Corp. (In re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 339 B.R. 570, 576 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
8 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2006). In bankruptcy cases commenced before April 21, 2006, the
applicable period is one year. This period was changed to two years by section 1402(1) of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (2005). Section 1406(b)(2) of that act provides that the change from one to two years shall be
effective only with respect to bankruptcy cases commenced more than one year after the date of
enactment.
9 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, at T 548.01 [ 11
t0 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2006).
11 Drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) in 1984. Some states have adopted the UFTA with local variations. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439-3449 (Deering 2008); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3101-3111 (LexisNexis
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:2-20-25:2-34 (West 2009); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5101-5110
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-3-301-66-3-313 (2009); PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF
FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 1:15 (Thomson/West 2006).
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Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),' 2 which are uniform statutes
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and recommended for state adoption. The majority of states
14
have enacted the UFTA. 13 A minority of states, including New York
and Maryland, 15 still follow the older UFCA, and a few states have nonuniform statutes.' 6 Both the UFTA and the UFCA recognize two types
7
of fraudulent conveyances: actual fraud and constructive fraud.'
Under the actual fraud prong of the UFTA and the UFCA, a
transfer or obligation is fraudulent when it is made or incurred with
"actual intent" to "hinder, delay or defraud" creditors of the debtor.' 8
The debtor's state of mind must be examined to determine the
motivation for the transfer. Though it may be relevant to the debtor's
motivation, the debtor's solvency at the time of the transfer is not a
defense. 19 An example of a fraudulent conveyance with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is when a debtor, while unable to pay
debts as they mature and worried about financial difficulties, gives
assets to friends and relatives for the purpose of putting them out of the
reach of creditors. Section 4 of the UFTA lists a number of factors or
"badges of fraud," as they are commonly referred to by the courts, that
20
may be considered in determining actual intent to defraud creditors.
Such considerations include whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property
transferred after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred,
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;

12 The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1918. Some states
have adopted the UFCA with local variations. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 15:20 1214 (West 2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 270-281 (McKinney Supp. 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2310-27-23-40 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§ 201-212 (2009); ALCES, supra note 11, at § 1:14.
13 Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA. See A Few Facts
About the... Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS: THE
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
COMMISSIONERS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,

http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufta.asp.
14 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 270-281 (McKinney Supp. 2009).
15 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 15:201-214 (West 2008).

16 See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-40 (2007).
17 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 548.01[2]-[4].
18 See U.F.T.A. § 4 (1984); U.F.C.A. § 7 (1918).

19 United States v. Green, 201 F.3d. 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2000); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In
re Monahan Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).

20 U.F.T.A. § 4(b) and cmt. 5 (1984); see also Sullivan v. Messer (In re Corcoran), 246 B.R.
152, 161 (E.D.N.Y 2000).
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(7)
(8)

the debtor absconded;
the debtor removed or concealed assets;
the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred
or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a
substantial debt was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to
a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the
21
debtor.
A constructive fraudulent conveyance is one that is not predicated
on the debtor's intentions or motivations, but is based on the debtor's
transfer of assets for less than reasonably equivalent value while
experiencing a poor financial condition. In particular, under the UFTA,
a transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value is a fraudulent
conveyance if (a) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, (b)
the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or
transaction for which the remaining assets were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction, or (c) the debtor intended to
incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that it would
incur, debts beyond its ability to pay as such debts become due. 22 The
UFCA has similar provisions with respect to constructive fraudulent
23
conveyances.
B.

FraudulentConveyances as Against Presentand Future Creditors

State law distinguishes between those transfers and obligations that
are fraudulent as to present creditors only, and those that are fraudulent
as to present and future creditors. Under both the UFTA and the UFCA,
a transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
24
creditor of the debtor is a fraud on both present and future creditors.
Therefore, if a debtor makes a transfer with the intent of putting assets
out of the reach of creditors, a future creditor whose claim did not exist
when the transfer was made would have standing to bring a fraudulent
21 U.F.T.A. § 4(b) and cmt. 5 (1984).
22 U.F.T.A.§§ 4(a)(2), 5(a) (1984).

23 U.F.C.A. §§ 4, 5 (1918). Instead of using the phrase "reasonably equivalent value," as is
used in the UFTA and § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the UFCA uses the phrase "fair

consideration," which is defined in section 3 of the UFCA to mean, in the context of an exchange
for property or an obligation, "a fair equivalent thereof, and in good faith ...
24 U.F.T.A. § 4 (1984); U.F.C.A. §§ 5, 6 (1918).
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conveyance action to avoid the transfer and recover the assets from the
25
transferee.
The UFTA and UFCA also give future creditors standing to avoid
a constructive fraudulent conveyance, but only if the action is based on
the debtor's receipt of less than reasonably equivalent value for the
transferred property when the debtor was left with unreasonably small
capital or when the debtor intended or believed it would incur debts
beyond its ability to pay as they mature. 26 If the claim of constructive
fraudulent conveyance is based on the insolvency of the debtor, it is a
fraud only against existing creditors. A future creditor does not have
the right to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim based on the allegation
that the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in
connection with the transfer and was insolvent or rendered insolvent by
the transfer.
The distinction between those transfers and obligations that are
fraudulent as to only present creditors, and those that are fraudulent as
to both present and future creditors, is also significant with respect to
the application of § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. If the basis for a
constructive fraudulent conveyance is that the debtor had unreasonably
small capital when it transferred property for less than reasonably
equivalent value, it would be relatively easy for the trustee to identify an
actual creditor with an allowable unsecured claim who could avoid the
transfer under state law. Any unsecured creditor with an allowable
claim in the bankruptcy case that existed at the time of the bankruptcy
filing could be the triggering creditor because the transfer was a fraud
on both present and future creditors. It would not be necessary for the
claim of the triggering creditor to have been in existence at the time of
the fraudulent transfer. But if the basis for the fraudulent conveyance
claim is that the debtor was insolvent when it transferred property for
25 Shelly v. Doe, 660 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943, 173 Misc. 2d 200, 208 (St. Lawrence County Ct.
1997) ("[A] creditor has standing to maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent transfer... even
though his debt may not have been in existence at the time of the transfer."), aff'd, 671 N.Y.S. 2d
803, 249 A.D. 2d 756 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998). Section 7 of the UFTA lists remedies available
to creditors. Under section 7, a creditor can obtain (a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; (b) an attachment or other provisional remedy
against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure
described by relevant statute; (c) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property; (d) appointment of a receiver to
take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or (e) any other relief
the circumstances may require. Section 7 of the UFTA derives from sections 9 and 10 of the
UFCA which provides for substantially the same remedies but splits them up in remedies of
holders or matured claims and remedies of holders of unmatured claims. A creditor holding an
unmatured claim may be denied the right to receive payment for the proceeds of a sale on
execution until its claim has matured, but the proceeds may be deposited in court or in an interest
bearing account pending the maturity of the claim.
26 U.F.T.A. § 4 (1984); U.F.C.A. §§ 5, 6 (1918); Shelly, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 944, 173 Misc. 2d at
210 (interpreting New York's fraudulent conveyance law based on the UFCA).
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less than reasonably equivalent value, and the transfer occurred more
than two years before the bankruptcy filing, in order to avoid the
transfer under § 544(b) and state law, the trustee would have to identify
a "present" unsecured creditor whose claim existed at the time of the
transfer and whose claim is also in existence and allowable at the time
of the bankruptcy filing.
Because the rights of future creditors depend on the debtor's
financial state-whether it was insolvent, undercapitalized, or believed
it would incur debts beyond its ability to pay-it is important to
understand the differences between these financial conditions.
The concept of insolvency has been defined in different ways,
depending on the governing statutory authority.
Insolvency is
sometimes defined in a manner that compares the value of assets to the
total amount of liabilities, often referred to as insolvency in the
"bankruptcy sense." For example, § 101(32)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code defines "insolvency" to mean "financial condition such that the
sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at
a fair valuation... "27 Under that definition, cash flow insufficiency or
inability to pay debts is irrelevant. In other statutory schemes,
insolvency includes the inability to pay debts as they mature, which is
commonly referred to as insolvency in the "equity sense." 28 For
example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "a person is
insolvent who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course
of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
'29
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law."
Both the UFCA and the UFTA also define insolvency. Under the
UFCA, "[a] person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of
his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his
probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and
matured." 30 Courts have characterized this definition as including both
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense (deficit net worth) and in the equity
sense (inability to pay debts as they mature). 31 If the debtor's assets
could be sold for a sum that is sufficient to pay its debts when due, the
27 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2006). Assets excluded from this definition include exempt
property under § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code and property transferred, concealed, or removed
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In addition, separate insolvency definitions are
provided in § 101(32)(A) for partnerships and municipalities.
28 See, e.g., Langham, Langston & Burnett v. Blanchard, 246 F.2d 529, 531-32 (5th Cir.
1957) (distinguishing the meaning of "insolvency" under the Bankruptcy Act from the equity test
of insolvency).
29 U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (2003).

30 U.F.C.A. § 2(1) (1918). A separate definition of "insolvent" is provided for partnerships.
See U.F.C.A. § 2(2) (1918).
31 See, e.g., Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1066 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing
Larrimer v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353, 411 Pa. 604, 607 (1963)); see also ALCES, supra note 11,

at § 5:59.

212

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

debtor is solvent. 32 The UFTA also defines insolvency by combining
the bankruptcy and equity sense. First, it provides that "[a] debtor is
insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the
debtor's assets, at a fair valuation. '33 However, the UFTA also provides
that "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his (or her) debts as they
'34
become due is presumed to be insolvent.
In contrast to the definitions of "insolvency" included in the UFCA
and UFTA, there is no definition for the concept of unreasonably small
capital, and courts differ on what they require to meet that financial
standard. Some courts require a showing of "something more than
insolvency or inability to pay debts"; a transaction leaving the debtor
35
with unreasonably small capital must place it on the "road to ruin".
Other courts have construed unreasonably small capital as a financial
condition that is short of insolvency in both the bankruptcy and equity
sense, but that is likely to lead to or result in insolvency in the near
term. 36 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Moody v.
Security Pacific Business Credit Inc.,37 commented that "unreasonably
small capital" refers to the inability to generate sufficient profits to
sustain operations. "Because an inability to generate enough cash flow
to sustain operations must precede an inability to pay obligations as they
become due, unreasonably small capital would seem to encompass
financial difficulties short of equitable solvency. '38 Accordingly, the
Third Circuit held that reasonable capitalization is determined by the
reasonable foreseeability of future profits, and that the critical test is
whether, at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer, the debtor's
financial projections showing future profitability were reasonable.
In a typical case, it is easier for a trustee to pursue fraudulent
transfers under the provisions of the UFTA or UFCA that require a
showing of insolvency, a well-defined concept, in contrast to those
provisions that require proof of undercapitalization or an intention or
39
belief that the debtor would incur debts beyond the ability to pay.

32
under
$26.2
33

For example, in Moody, 971 F.2d at 1066, the court found that the debtor was solvent
the UFCA definition because it could have sold its assets as a going concern for at least
million to $27.2 million, and the company's liabilities totaled $25.2 million.
U.F.T.A. § 2(a) (1984).

34 U.F.T.A. § 2(b) (1984).

35 Daley v. Chang (In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp.), 286 B.R. 54, 76 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 2002)
("[T]he trustee must show something more than a deteriorated balance sheet... or that [the
debtor] had difficulty paying its trade creditors.").
36 Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 B.R. 127,
137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
37 Moody, 971 F.2d at 1070.
38 Id. at 1070.
39 Dan Schechter, "Triggering Creditor" for Purposes of Trustee's Fraudulent Transfer
Claim Need Not Hold Same Claim on Transfer Date and Petition Date [In re Allou Distribs., Inc.

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y.)], 2008 COM. FIN. NEWSLETTER 76 (Sept. 8, 2008).
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The DerivativeNature of§ 544(b) and Available Defenses Under
State Law

As discussed above, a bankruptcy trustee may use § 544(b) to
avoid a fraudulent conveyance if there exists an actual unsecured
creditor with an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate, but only
if that creditor, under state law, could have avoided the transfer in the
absence of bankruptcy. In essence, the trustee must stand in the shoes
of that actual creditor. It naturally follows, therefore, that if the
transferee of the property would have a valid defense in a state
fraudulent conveyance case brought by the actual creditor, the trustee
would be subject to the same defense. 40 For example, if the triggering
creditor is estopped from bringing a fraudulent conveyance claim, the
trustee would be subject to the same estoppel defense. 4 1 Similarly, if
the applicable statute of limitations had expired before the bankruptcy
petition was filed, the trustee's action under § 544(b) would be subject
to the same statute of limitations defense. 42 In states that have enacted
the UFTA, the statute provides that any claim under the UFTA is
"extinguished" unless it is brought within a specified time period, which
is generally four years after the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred. 43 The UFCA does not have any uniform statute of limitations
or period of extinguishment of the claim, but each state governed by the
UFCA has its own limitations period. In New York, that period is six
44
years.
There is one exception to the general rule that under § 544(b) the
trustee has no better rights than the actual creditor on whose rights the
trustee is depending. Suppose that a debtor, while insolvent, gave her
brother a gift of $50,000 to help him cope with his own financial
difficulties resulting from unexpected medical expenses. Also, suppose
40 See, e.g., Davis v. Willey, 263 F. 588, 589 (N.D. Cal. 1920), af'd, 273 F. 397 (9th Cir.
1921); Smith v. Am. Founders Fin. Corp., 365 B.R. 647, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2007); 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, at $ 544.07[3].
41 Harris v. Huff (In re Huff), 160 B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
42 Heffron v. Duggins, 115 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1940); see also 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, at $ 544.07[3]. But see 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2006) (imposing a time
limit for the trustee to commence an action to avoid a transfer or obligation under the trustee's
avoiding powers, including actions brought under § 544(b)). Section 546(a) does not, however,
extend the applicable statute of limitations under state fraudulent conveyance law if it had expired
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
43 U.F.T.A. § 9 (1984). Section 9 of the UFTA includes a few exceptions to the general fouryear period with respect to the extinguishment of the claim. The period for bringing claims under
section 4(a)(1) (actual fraud) is four years after the transfer was made or, if later, one year after

the transfer was or could reasonably be discovered by the claimant. In addition, the period for
commencing an action based on the fraudulent transfer by an insider under UFTA section 5(b) is
one year after the transfer was made.
44 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney Supp. 2009).
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that all of her creditors are subsequently paid in full, except for one
unsecured creditor owed $2,000 at the time of the gift. The gift was not
made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the debtor's creditors;
instead, it was motivated by a desire to help the debtor's brother. But
the gift was a constructive fraudulent conveyance because, while
insolvent, the debtor made the gift, of course, for less than reasonably
equivalent value. Under the UFTA or the UFCA, that creditor could
have recovered no more than $2,000 from the debtor's brother, the
transferee of the fraudulent conveyance. Clearly, state law would not,
and should not, give a creditor owed only $2,000 a windfall by enabling
the creditor to recover fraudulently conveyed assets worth more than the
debt owed to that creditor. Moreover, if the trustee can prove the
insolvency of the debtor at the time of the transfer, but cannot
demonstrate that she had unreasonably small capital for any business or
contemplated transaction, or that she intended to incur, or believed that
she would incur, debts beyond her ability to pay as they mature, the
transfer would not be avoidable by any creditors whose claims arose
after the date of the making of the gift. Thus, the only creditor with the
ability to avoid the gift is the one unsecured creditor owed only $2,000.
If the debtor files a bankruptcy petition three years after the gift, §
548 of the Bankruptcy Code would not be available to the trustee
because the transfer occurred more than two years before bankruptcy. 4 5
However, if the trustee relies on § 544(b) and state law to avoid the
transfer to the debtor's brother, the trustee may recover the entire
$50,000 fraudulent conveyance notwithstanding that the only creditor
with standing to prosecute a fraudulent conveyance action outside of
bankruptcy is owed only $2,000. This doctrine, which is often referred
to as the doctrine of Moore v. Bay46 because of the Supreme Court
decision on which it is based, permits the bankruptcy trustee to stand in
the "overshoes" of the actual creditor to recover the entire fraudulent
conveyance for the benefit of all creditors even though the only actual
creditor who could have avoided it under state law is owed only a
fraction of that amount. 47 Thus, although the trustee's power under §
544(b) derives only from the power of an actual unsecured creditor who
could have avoided the transfer outside of bankruptcy, the trustee may
48
recover far more than that creditor could have recovered.

45
46
47
48

11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
Id.; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, at 544.07[4].
Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741, 749 n.16 (5th Cir. 1967).
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I.

INREALLOUDISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND THE DERIVATIVE NATURE OF

§ 544(b)
Allou Distributors, Inc., and several of its affiliates were engaged
in the business of distributing brand name health and beauty aid
products, fragrances, and other similar items. 4 9 Allou was in a poor
financial condition in 1999. On June 15 of that year, Allou transferred
$149,945 by check to Sound Around, Inc., a wholesale supplier of
televisions, audio devices, and other electronic equipment.5 0 It was
undisputed that, at the time of the transfer, each of the relevant Allou
entities was insolvent in that the fair saleable value of its assets was less
than the sum of its liabilities. 51 In addition, Allou had unreasonably
small capital to carry on its business and had incurred debts beyond its
52
ability to pay in a timely manner.
Almost four years later, in April, 2003, the Allou companies
became debtors under the Bankruptcy Code when voluntary petitions
were filed by certain Allou entities, and involuntary petitions were filed
against other Allou entities, each seeking relief under Chapter 11.53 In
September 2003, the Chapter 11 cases were converted to Chapter 7
liquidation cases, and a trustee was appointed to represent the
bankruptcy estates. 54 Three months later, the bankruptcy court entered
an order substantively consolidating the debtors so that they would be
55
treated as one entity.
In March 2005, the trustee commenced an action against Sound
Around asserting actual and constructive fraudulent conveyance causes
of action to recover the $149,945 payment made to Sound Around in
1999.56 Because the alleged fraudulent transfer took place more than
one year before the commencement of the bankruptcy case, § 548 of the
Code was not available to the trustee. 57 Thus, the trustee resorted to §
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and to the state fraudulent conveyance
49 Amended Complaint, Silverman v. Sound Around, Inc. (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), Adv.
Pro. No. 05-08219 (MLC), at 2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Amended
Complaint, In re Allou Distribs.].
50 Id. at 6.

51 Silverman v. Sound Around, Inc. (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), 392 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2008); Amended Complaint, In re Allou Distribs., supra note 49, at 8.
52 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 28.

53 Id. at 27.
54 Id.

55 Id.
56 Id.
57 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). The two-year period in § 548(a) applies only in bankruptcy cases
commenced on or after April 21, 2006. In cases filed before April 21, 2006, the period is one
year. See supra note 11.
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laws of New York, which are based on the Uniform Fraudulent
58
Conveyances Act, as the basis for its causes of action.
In particular, the complaint and, later, the amended complaint,
alleged that the transfer to Sound Around was for no consideration and
did not serve any legitimate corporate purpose. 59 The trustee sought to
recover the transferred amount from Sound Around under section 276
of the New York Debtor & Creditor Law, which provides that a transfer
made with intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors is an actual
fraudulent conveyance and may be recovered by the transferor's
creditors. 60 The other causes of action were for constructive fraudulent
conveyances under sections 273, 274, and 275 of the New York Debtor
& Creditor Law. 6 1 The trustee alleged that Allou received less than fair
consideration in exchange for the $149,945 paid to Sound Around, and
that Allou (a) was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer to
Sound Around, (b) was engaged in a business or transaction for which
the property remaining in its possession after the transfer was
unreasonably small capital, and (c) at the time of the transfer the
Debtors had incurred debts beyond its ability to pay as the debts
matured. 62 After motions to dismiss were made early in the proceeding,
the complaint was amended to remove a demand for punitive
63
damages.
Sound Around filed an answer denying many of the allegations and
including an affirmative defense that Sound Around acted in good faith
and provided fair consideration to Allou for any funds received. 64 The
bankruptcy court tried the matter, after which the trustee withdrew with
prejudice his claim based on actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, and his requests for interest and attorneys' fees. 65 In a joint
pretrial memorandum, the parties stipulated that the transfer occurred
capital, and
and that Allou was insolvent, had unreasonably small
66
incurred debts beyond its ability to pay as they matured.
At the close of the trustee's case at the trial, Sound Around made
an oral motion for judgment dismissing the adversary proceeding on
grounds that the trustee lacked standing under § 544(b). 67 The court
permitted the trustee to reopen his case to introduce evidence of his
standing to prosecute the fraudulent conveyance claims. The trustee
58 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-275 (McKinney 2001),
59 Amended Complaint, In re Allou Distribs., supra note 49, at 6, 7.
60 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (McKinney 2001).
61 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-275 (McKinney 2001).
62 Amended Complaint, In re Allou Distributors,Inc., supra note 49, at 5-6, 8.
63 Silverman v. Sound Around, Inc. (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), 392 B.R. 24, 27-28 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2008).
64 Id. at28.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 28-29.
67 Id. at 28.
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introduced evidence that, at the time of the $149,945 payment to Sound
Around in 1999, Allou had three trade creditors with outstanding claims
arising from the delivery of goods to Allou. 68 Within a month after the
Sound Around transfer, the three trade creditors were paid in full. More
than two years later, each of the same three trade creditors again
extended credit to Allou, and those claims remained unpaid when, in
2003, Allou became a debtor in a bankruptcy case. The three trade
creditors filed proofs of claim asserting general unsecured claims in the
aggregate amount of $3.8 million based on transactions between 2001
and the commencement of the bankruptcy case in 2003.69 Sound
Around again moved to dismiss the proceeding, 70 alleging that,
notwithstanding the three trade creditors, the trustee lacked standing to
bring the fraudulent conveyance action under § 544(b) of the Code.
A.

A Matter of Standing

The bankruptcy court in In re Allou Distributorscharacterized the
issue as one of standing. Recognizing that a trustee in a Chapter 7 case
is charged with the administration of the bankruptcy estate and has
certain powers, including the power to avoid preferences 7 ' and
fraudulent conveyances, the court commented that the trustee, like any
other plaintiff, must establish that he or she has standing to bring the
particular claim under the avoiding powers. 72 The court also noted that
standing has its roots in Article III of the United States Constitution,
limits the federal courts to deciding cases or controversies, and requires
that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.7 3 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
written:
[A bankruptcy trustee's standing] [c]oincides with the scope of the
powers the Bankruptcy Codes gives a trustee, that is, if a trustee has
no power to assert a claim because it is not one belonging to the
prudential limitation
bankrupt estate, then he also fails to meet the
74
that the legal rights asserted must be his own.
The court described § 544(b) as defining the "boundaries of a
bankruptcy trustee's standing to bring an action to avoid a fraudulent
68 Id. at 29.
69 Id.
70 The motion was made under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made
applicable to adversary proceedings by Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Id. at 26.
71 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
72 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 30.
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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transfer made by a debtor. ' 75 For the remainder of its opinion, the court
discussed whether the requirements of § 544(b) had been met.

B.

The Court'sApplication of § 544(b)

The bankruptcy court in In re Allou Distributors focused on the
language of § 544(b)(1), which provides that a trustee may avoid any
transfer of the debtor's property "that is voidable under applicable law
by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under § 502
of [the Bankruptcy Code] ... ,,76 The court commented that, based on
this language, "[s]ection 544(b)(1) requires a trustee to show both that
there is an actual creditor as to whom the transfer is 'voidable under
applicable law,' and that the creditor 'hold[s] an unsecured claim that is
'77
allowable under § 502 of this title.'
Sound Around argued that the trustee failed to demonstrate that he
had standing to bring an action under § 544(b)(1) because the only three
trade creditors identified as existing at the time of the payment of
$149,945 were paid in full soon after the transfer and, therefore, they no
longer had the right to avoid such payment at the time of Allou's
bankruptcy filing. 78 Thus, the claims they had at the time of the transfer
no longer existed when the bankruptcy petition was filed. Because of
the payment of those claims, the three trade creditors had lost their right
to bring fraudulent conveyance actions under New York fraudulent
conveyance law. 79 Indeed, creditors who have been fully paid for all
debts incurred prior to a transfer lack standing to avoid the transfer
based on the debtor's insolvency. 80 Though the three trade creditors
also had allowable claims under § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code at the
time of bankruptcy, those claims were different claims than those held
at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. 81 Consistent with the
derivative nature of § 544(b), Sound Around asserted that, since none of
the three trade creditors could bring a fraudulent conveyance action on
its own, they "[did] not qualify as triggering creditors, and [did] not

75 Id. at 30-31. It is apparent that the court was referring only to fraudulent transfers that can
not be avoided under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
76 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2006).

77 In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 31 (emphasis added); MC Asset Recovery, LLC v. S. Co.,
No. 06-0417B, 2006 WL 5112612, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006); Ries v. Wintz Props., Inc. (In
re Wintz Cos.), 230 B.R. 848, 859 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
78 In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 33.
79 Id.

80 Oparaji v. Madison-Queens Guy Brewer, LLC, 754 N.Y.S.2d 907, 302 A.D.2d 439, 440,
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003); MFS/Sun Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs.
Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
81 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 33.
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provide a basis for the Trustee's standing to bring his claims. 8 2
The trustee did not dispute the fact that the three trade creditors,
having been paid in full, would not have the ability to avoid the alleged
fraudulent transfer when the bankruptcy case was commenced.
However, the trustee's position was that it was irrelevant that the three
trade creditors were no longer able to avoid the fraudulent transfer. The
trustee argued that standing to prosecute the fraudulent conveyance
claim under § 544(b) exists solely because (1) the three trade creditors
had claims at the time of the alleged fraudulent conveyance, and (2) the
same three trade creditors had unsecured claims that were allowable in
the bankruptcy case. 83 "No further examination of the debtor/creditor
relationship is required or warranted under Bankruptcy Code §
544(b). '84 In particular, the trustee argued that there is no requirement
that the claim held at the time of the transfer be the same claim that
exists at the time of bankruptcy. The trustee asserted that Congress had
not imposed such an "identical claim requirement" when it drafted and
85
twice amended § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy court found the trustee's argument persuasive:
[11n order to satisfy the standing requirements of [§] 544, the same
creditor that has an allowed unsecured claim on the Petition Date
must also have been a creditor of the transferor on the Transfer
Date.... In other words, a triggering creditor must be the same
creditor on both the Transfer Date and the Petition Date, but need not
86
hold the same claim at these two essential points in time.
In agreeing with the trustee's arguments, the court pointed out that
the fact that the creditors were paid in full following the pre-transfer
deliveries of goods did not alter their status as creditors. 87 To illustrate
that point, the court noted that "several courts have found that in the
context of a series of transactions, such as an open account relationship,
paying a creditor's account down to zero does not terminate its ongoing
creditor status," 88 and the court relied on three decisions dealing with
ongoing business relationships where creditors were periodically paid in
full. In In re RCM Global Long Term CapitalAppreciation Fund, Ltd.,
the bankruptcy court held that certain professionals who continuously
provided services to the debtor could be triggering creditors for
purposes of 544(b) fraudulent conveyance actions despite having been
82 Id.
83 Id.

84 Id. (quoting Trustee's Memorandum of Law at 8-9, In re Allou Distribs., Inc., No. 0508219 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008)).
85 Id. at 34 (citing Trustee's Memorandum of Law at 5, In re Allou Distribs., Inc., No. 0508219 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008)). Section 544(b) was amended in 1984 and 1998.
86 Id.

87 Id. at 34-35.
88 Id.

220

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1:1

paid in full at various points between the transfer date and the petition
date.8 9 In In re Bushey, the court held that, under Ohio fraudulent
conveyance law, a credit card company qualified as a "present" creditor
with a claim that existed at both the time of the alleged fraudulent
conveyance and the time of the bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding that
the account had a zero balance at some moment between challenged
transfer and filing date. 90 In In re Aluminum Mills Corp., where a
lender extended a revolving credit line to a borrower and the parties
contemplated an ongoing indebtedness, the court held that payment of
the particular debt did not terminate the ongoing debtor-creditor
relationship for purposes of applying § 544(b). 9 1
By treating open account creditors as existing creditors at the time
of the transfer, notwithstanding zero balances after the transfer, the
courts effectively deprived them of the defense of full payment. The
rationale for treating open account creditors as pre-transfer creditors
under state fraudulent conveyance laws, despite subsequent zero
balances, was described by the court in In re Bushey:
In an open account context, the "existing" creditor relationship is not
defined by the balance on the account; it is the availability and
continuous use of the credit facility that determines whether an
appropriate creditor interest is present against which to measure the
propriety of a conveyance. Every change in the balance of an open
account-including a change to or from "zero"--is a "new balance,"
not a "new debt" for fraudulent conveyances purposes. Reduction to
a zero balance of an open account, no other facts appearing, tells
creditors nothing about the underlying financial condition of the
borrower.... The continuous nature of the risk faced by the creditor
in an open account relationship is the defining characteristic of an
"existing" creditor, not the account balance at any moment during
92
that relationship.
The three cited cases are distinguishable from the facts of In re
Allou Distributors because, in each of the cited cases, the creditor
maintained a continuous relationship with the transferor during the
period of time between the transfer and the commencement of the
fraudulent transfer action. In In re RCM Global Long Term Capital
Appreciation Fund, Ltd., the triggering creditors were the debtor's
professionals and administrators who continued to provide services,
89 In re RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, Ltd., 200 B.R. 514, 523 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Certain of the Debtor's professionals and administrators were owed money at
the time of the transfer. That they were subsequently paid for those particular services is of no
consequence because they continued to provide services after the transfer for which they have
still not been paid.").
90 Belfance v. Bushey (In re Bushey), 210 B.R. 95, 100 (B.A.P 6th Cir. 1997).
91 Aluminum Mills Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R.
869, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
92 In reBushey, 210 B.R. at 102.
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apparently uninterrupted, after the transfer for which they had not been
paid. 93 Similarly, the court in In re Bushey found that a credit card
company that had an open account relationship with the transferor could
satisfy that state statute's definition of "existing creditor. '94 The court
in In re Aluminum Mills Corp. found that "[c]laims arising from open
trade accounts with [the] [d]ebtor constitute preexisting claims
sufficient to confer standing ... under Illinois law." 95
Thus, each of these cases involved distinguishable facts and
circumstances that supported the relevant court's finding that there was
an existing creditor relationship that spanned the time of the transfer and
the time of the commencement of the fraudulent conveyance action. By
contrast, there was no such finding of a continuing existing debtorcreditor relationship in In re Allou Distributors. Nonetheless, the court
seems to have extended the holding of In re Bushey-that "the focus of
§ 544(b) is on the identity of the creditor, not on the historical
relationship between the creditor's claim and the debtor" 96-to
demonstrate that the intervening full payment of the debt owed to each
of the three trade creditors "does not change the fact that as of the
Transfer Date, each of the Proffered Creditors was a creditor of the
97
Debtors."
More importantly, it does not appear from the decision that the
court was citing the three cases to support a conclusion that, if Allou
Distributors had received less than fair consideration, the three
triggering creditors, under New York fraudulent conveyance law, could
have avoided the $149,945 payment to Sound Around at the time of the
bankruptcy filing. In particular, the court does not appear to go so far as
to indicate that these cases should stand as authority, apart from the
requirements of § 544(b), to show that a former creditor that was fully
paid and that had not maintained a continuous ongoing debtor-creditor
relationship with the transferor would have standing to bring a
fraudulent transfer claim under New York's version of the UFCA,
solely because it again became a creditor of the transferor several years
after the transfer and has an allowable unsecured claim in the
transferor's bankruptcy case.
To be clear, if it was the intention of the court to find that, if Allou
Distributors had received less than fair consideration, the three trade
creditors, applying New York constructive fraudulent conveyance law
93 In re RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, 200 B.R. at 523. It is also
important to note that Judge Brozman explained in her decision that in the RCM Global case no
one was seeking to dismiss the fraudulent transfer action and that it remained to be seen whether
proof ofa qualifying creditor would conform to the statute's requirement. Id. at 524.
94 In re Bushey, 210 B.R. at 102.
95 In reAluminum Mills, 132 B.R. at 890.
96 In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 34 (quoting In re Bushey, 210 B.R. at 101).
97 In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 35.
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applicable to transfers by insolvent debtors, could have avoided the
$149,945 payment to Sound Around on the date of the bankruptcy filing
despite payment of the earlier debts, the holding of the court would have
been consistent with the derivative nature of § 544(b). However, the
court does not express such an intention and cites no authority under
New York law that would support such a finding. Rather, the court
apparently acknowledged that the three trade creditors would not have
been able to avoid the $149,945 payment at the time of bankruptcy
because of the payment defense, but did not consider that dispositive.
It is surely true that where a creditor holds a claim that is satisfied in
full, 'the creditor no longer has a cause of action to recover assets
conveyed by the debtor or a transferee.' ... But the payment of the
claim does not somehow retroactively alter the creditor's status as a
98
creditor at the time of the transfer.
The court held, therefore, that the three trade creditors qualified as
triggering creditors and supported the trustee's standing to bring the
fraudulent conveyances action against Sound Around under § 544(b)
and applicable state law. 99
The reasoning in In re Allou Distributors appears to depart from
the derivative nature of § 544(b) by not strictly adhering to state
fraudulent conveyance law. As discussed above, § 544(b) gives the
trustee the power to avoid transfers and obligations that are voidable by
an unsecured creditor under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 100 Yet, the
court seems to give only passing significance to state fraudulent
conveyance law and attempts to resolve the trustee's powers by
focusing primarily on the language of § 544(b). In fact, a closer
analysis of New York's fraudulent conveyance laws reveals that
identifying an actual creditor that held a claim at the time of the
fraudulent transfer was not necessary to reach the conclusion that the
trustee had standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance action against
Sound Around.

98 Id. at 34 (quoting MFS/Sun Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs., Co.,
910 F. Supp. 913,931 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
99 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 35. On April 23, 2009, nine months after the bankruptcy
court's decision holding that the trustee had standing to prosecute the fraudulent conveyance
action, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendant, Sound Around, and dismissed the
amended complaint with prejudice upon finding that the trustee had failed to establish at trial that
Allou Distributors received less than fair consideration in exchange for the $149,950 payment to
Sound Around. Silverman v. Sound Around, Inc. (In re Allou Distributors, Inc.), 404 B.R. 710

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y 2009).
100 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
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C.

The Rights of Future Creditors

The trustee's complaint against Sound Around alleged that the
$149,945 payment in 1999 was a constructive fraudulent conveyance
voidable under sections 273, 274, and 275 of the New York Debtor &
Creditor Law.' 0' Most significantly, section 274 provides as follows:
[Section] 274.

Conveyances by persons in business. Every

conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making
it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an
unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to
other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such
10 2
business or transactionwithout regard to his actual intent.
Section 274 makes it clear that, if a conveyance is made for less
than fair consideration, and the conveyance leaves the transferor with
unreasonably small capital, the transfer is voidable by creditors with
claims incurred after, as well as before, the transfer. 10 3 As mentioned in
the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Allou Distributors, the parties
stipulated in a joint pretrial memorandum that "[a]t the time of the
Transfer, the Debtors were engaged in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in its possession after the conveyance was
unreasonably small capital."' 04 Further, Allou's business continued
from the time of the payment to Sound Around in 1999 until the date of
Allou's bankruptcy in 2003. Thus, under section 274, in the absence of
bankruptcy, the transfer could have been avoided by any creditor with
an allowable unsecured claim regardless of when incurred.
Similarly, section 275 of the New York Debtor & Creditor Law,
provides as follows:
[Section] 275. Conveyances by a person about to incur debts. Every
conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair
consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering
into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond
his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and
0 5

future creditors.1

Again, it is clear from the plain meaning of the state statute that a
101In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at

27.
102 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 274 (McKinney 2001) (second emphasis added).
103 Id.; see also Julien J. Studly, Inc. v. Lefrak, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905, 66 A.D.2d 208 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1979) ("[U]nder [New York Debtor and Creditor Law] a creditor has standing to
maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent transfer, though his debt may not have been in
existence at the time of the transfer...."), affd, 401 N.E.2d 187, 48 N.Y.2d 954, 425 N.Y.S.2d

65 (1979).
104 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 28-29.
105 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 275 (McKinney 2001) (second emphasis added).
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constructive fraudulent conveyance under section 275 can be based on
the presence of a future creditor-i.e., one who does not have a claim
against the Debtor at the time of the transfer, but who has a claim
subsequently. Also, as with undercapitalization, the parties stipulated in
their joint pretrial memorandum that "[a]t the time of the Transfer, the
Debtors had incurred debts beyond its [sic] ability to pay them as they
matured."' 10 6 However, while the parties stipulated that Allou had
incurred debts beyond its ability to pay as of the time of the transfer, the
parties' stipulation was not sufficient for the trustee to rely on section
275 with respect to future creditors because it did not provide that Allou
intended or believed that it would in the future incur debts beyond its
07
ability to pay as they mature.1
In view of the stipulations regarding Allou's financial condition at
the time of the payment, and the provisions of sections 274 and 275 of
the New York Debtor & Creditor Law, the result in In re Allou
Distributors regarding the trustee's standing was correct in that the
three trade creditors relied upon by the trustee as the basis for the
fraudulent conveyance action were appropriate triggering creditors.
Those creditors clearly had allowable unsecured claims that arose after
the transfer and, therefore, were at least future creditors. Whether they
also had claims against Allou at the time of the payment in question was
irrelevant. Moreover, any entity with an allowable unsecured claim in
the bankruptcy case that became a creditor after the transfer could have
served as the triggering creditor for § 544(b) purposes.
In contrast to sections 274 and 275 of the New York Debtor &
Creditor Law, section 273 provides that:
[Section] 273. Conveyances by Insolvent. Every conveyance made
and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby
rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his
actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred
08
without a fair consideration.1
Note that there is no mention of future creditors in section 273.
Accordingly, if the only basis for a constructive fraudulent conveyance
action is that the debtor was insolvent at the time of a transfer for less
than fair consideration, and there is no determination that the debtor was
undercapitalized or believed it would incur debts beyond its ability to
pay, the trustee would have the right to avoid the transfer under §
544(b) only if he or she could find a "present" creditor with an allowed
106 In re Allou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 29.
107 Cf Shelly v. Doe, 660 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943-44, 173 Misc.2d 200, 208-11 (St. Lawrence
County Ct. 1997) (The court stated that section 275 applies to future creditors but ruled that the
trustee failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transferor intended or had
knowledge that it would be unable to pay debts as they mature.), aft'd, 671 N.Y.S.2d 803, 249
A.D.2d 756 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998).
108 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney 2001).
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unsecured claim that could have avoided the conveyance in the absence
of bankruptcy.
D.

Suggesting a Different Approach

The court's focus on the language of § 544(b)(1) was an
appropriate starting point for determining whether the trustee in In re
Allou Distributors had standing to avoid the $149,945 payment to
Sound Around, but the analysis was imprecise. The court's analysis
was mostly textual, focusing on the words of § 544(b)(1). The court's
conclusion, however, appears to be inconsistent with the tense used in
the statute. Section 544(b)(1) provides that the trustee may avoid a
transfer of the debtor's property "that is voidable" under applicable law
by a creditor holding an allowable unsecured claim. 10 9 By holding that
§ 544(b) requires the existence of a creditor who held a claim at the
time of the transfer, despite the defense of full payment of that claim,
the court interpreted the words "is voidable" as if the words were "is or
was voidable." Since the section speaks in the present tense, the better
view is that the triggering creditor must be one that, at the time of
bankruptcy, has the right to avoid the transfer under applicable
nonbankruptcy law. The plain meaning of § 544(b)(1) would lead to the
conclusion that the trustee must find a triggering creditor that could
have avoided the transfer at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
In addition, the court, despite repeatedly stating that § 544(b) is
derivative of the rights of unsecured creditors, appears to have departed
from that principle in two ways. First, the court did not look
sufficiently at applicable state law as the predicate for the trustee's
standing under § 544(b). All rights of the trustee under § 544(b) must
derive from nonbankruptcy law.110 If the court examined applicable
New York state law, it would have recognized that, for the purpose of
exercising the trustee's avoidance power under § 544(b), the
identification of an unsecured creditor that held a claim at the time of
the fraudulent transfer was not necessary if the debtor was
undercapitalized or intended or believed it would incur debts beyond its
ability to pay as such debts mature. 1 ' All the court had to hold was
that, based on the stipulation of the parties that Allou Distributors had
unreasonably small capital, the payment to Sound Around was a fraud
on present and future creditors and, therefore, any creditor with an
allowed unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case could have served as
the triggering creditor. Instead, however, the decision reasoned that §
109 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
110 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2006).
111 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 274-275 (McKinney 2001).
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544(b) could not give the trustee standing to avoid a transfer unless it
could identify a creditor that held an unsecured claim at the time of the
fraudulent transfer, as well as at the time of bankruptcy. The decision
did not address the rights of future creditors under applicable state
fraudulent conveyance law.
The decision also departed from the derivative nature of § 544(b)
by concluding that, when applicable, the required identification of a
present creditor at the time of the fraudulent transfer may be satisfied so
long as such creditor also held an allowable unsecured claim--any
allowable unsecured claim-in the bankruptcy case, without also
determining that the creditor could have avoided the transfer under state
law at the time of the bankruptcy filing notwithstanding full payment of
the earlier debt.
E.

PotentialConsequences of the In re Allou Distributors Decision

The court's conclusions-that "in order to satisfy the standing
requirements of § 544, the same creditor that has an allowed unsecured
claim on the Petition Date must also have been a creditor of the
transferor on the Transfer Date," but "need not hold the same claim at
these two essential points in time," 1 2 and that the transferee's complete
defense under state law based on the full payment of its original claim is
not a bar to the trustee's avoidance under § 544(b)-could lead to both
the narrowing as well as the expansion of the trustee's powers.
For an illustration of the narrowing effect of the court's holding on
the trustee's powers under § 544(b), suppose a situation in which the
debtor had transferred assets for less than reasonably equivalent value
while undercapitalized, as well as while insolvent. Subsequently, all
existing creditors are paid in full. Suppose further that three years later
the debtor files for bankruptcy and that none of the creditors that existed
at the time of the fraudulent transfer have allowed unsecured claims in
the bankruptcy case. Could the trustee use § 544(b) to avoid the
transfer, assuming at least one allowed unsecured claim in the
bankruptcy case? In either a UFTA or UFCA jurisdiction, the answer
should be "yes" because any creditor with an allowed unsecured claim
would be a future creditor under state fraudulent conveyance law and
the presence of a future creditor should be sufficient to give the trustee
However, the court in Allou
the power to avoid the transfer.
Distributorsmade no such distinction based on state law and apparently
held that a trustee has standing to bring a § 544(b) avoidance action
only if at least one of the holders of an allowable unsecured claim in the
112 In reAllouDistribs., 392 B.R. at 34.
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bankruptcy case also held a claim-any claim-at the time of the
13
fraudulent conveyance.'
To demonstrate how the holding in In re Allou Distributors also
broadens the trustee's powers under § 544(b), assume the same facts as
those in In re Allou Distributors,except that the trustee is able to prove
that the debtor received less than fair consideration and was insolvent at
the time of the transfer, but could not demonstrate that the debtor had
unreasonably small capital or that the debtor believed or intended that it
would not be able to pay its debts as they mature. Also suppose that the
trustee is unable to identify any creditor existing at the time of
bankruptcy that could have avoided the transfer under state law at the
time of bankruptcy, but could identify creditors that had claims at the
time of the transfer and also have different unsecured claims that have
been allowed in the bankruptcy case. Arguably, under the apparent
rationale of In re Allou Distributors,the trustee could avoid the transfer
despite the fact that no existing creditor has such power under state law.
This result would give the trustee powers that no actual creditor
possesses and, therefore, goes well beyond the derivative nature of §
544(b).
F.

PotentialEffect of the Decision on the Statute of Limitations

Taking the reasoning of In re Allou Distributors another step
further, suppose that seven years before it files a bankruptcy petition, a
company transfers assets for less than reasonably equivalent value while
insolvent (but not undercapitalized or under the belief or intention that it
will not be able to pay its debts as they mature), and that, as in New
York, applicable state law has a six-year statute of limitations for
fraudulent conveyances. Suppose further that the trustee identifies a
creditor that had an unsecured claim at the time of the fraudulent
conveyance that had been fully paid. Suppose further that the same
creditor holds an unrelated allowable unsecured claim when the
bankruptcy petition was filed. Clearly, the creditor would not be able to
avoid the transfer under state law because of the statute of limitations
defense. 14 But is that materially different than the situation in In re
Allou Distributors,in which the triggering creditors had lost their right
to sue Sound Around to avoid the transfer under state law because they
had been paid in full? Is the defense of the statute of limitations
different than the defense of full payment for the purpose of enforcing
the trustee's avoiding powers under § 544(b)? If, as the court

113 In reAllou Distribs., 392 B.R. at 34-35.
114 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, at

1 544.07[3].

228

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1: 1

apparently held in In re Allou Distributors, the trustee has standing to
recover under § 544(b) so long as the trustee can identify a creditor that
had a pre-transfer claim and also has an allowed unsecured claim in the
bankruptcy case, regardless of whether the transferee would have a
complete defense against the triggering creditor under state law, it
appears that a court that follows the reasoning of In re Allou
Distributors could hold that the trustee would be able to avoid the
transfer under § 544(b) despite the statute of limitations defense.
Such an abrogation of state statutes of limitations with respect to
fraudulent conveyance actions brought under § 544(b), though a logical
extension of In re Allou Distributors,would be a drastic departure from
prevailing law. Courts have uniformly held that a trustee may not bring
an avoidance action under § 544(b) if the applicable state statute of
limitations would bar any and all creditors from bringing a fraudulent
conveyance action under state law.1 15 Otherwise, there would be no
time limits on the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances if the transferor
becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case. 116 It is doubtful that the court in
In re Allou Distributorsintended that its holding would lead to such an
abrogation of state statutes of limitations in the context of a § 544(b)
avoidance action.
Arguably, the concern that the reasoning of In re Allou
Distributorswould allow a trustee to side-step around a state statute of
limitations and subject transfers to fraudulent conveyance attack for an
indefinite period is less of a danger in most states because the UFTA,
applicable in a majority of the states, has a statute of extinguishment
instead of a statute of limitations. The UFTA provides that a claim for
relief or cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or
obligation under that act "is extinguished" unless an action is brought
within the relevant time period, which in most situations involving
constructive fraud is four years.' 17 The official comment to the UFTA
explains that the purpose of the section "is to make clear that lapse of
the statutory periods prescribed by the section bars the right and not
merely the remedy." ' 1 8 Courts are not likely to go so far as to permit
115 See supra note 42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statute of limitations
defense.
116 In this regard, it should be noted that § 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes a statute of
limitations on the trustee's exercise of the avoiding powers. Such actions must be commenced by
the trustee before the later of two years after the commencement of the bankruptcy case, or one
year after the appointment or election of the first trustee in the case if such appointment or
election takes place within two years after the commencement of the case. However, if the
trustee seeks to avoid a fraudulent conveyance under § 544(b) and applicable state law, the
limitations period in § 546(a) does not extend the state statute of limitations or revive the cause of
action if the state statute of limitations expires before the bankruptcy case is commenced. 11
U.S.C. § 546(a).
117 U.F.T.A. § 9(1984).
118 U.F.T.A. § 9 cmt. 1 (1984).
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the trustee to resurrect an extinguished cause of action under § 544(b).
Nonetheless, an extension of the reasoning of In re Allou Distributorspermitting the trustee to avoid a fraudulent transfer even when the
triggering creditor would be subject to a complete defense under state
law-arguably could be used to avoid the effect of the extinguishment
of the claim under the UFTA.
CONCLUSION

The theory underlying § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is that a
trustee, as the representative of the bankruptcy estate, should have the
same rights and powers that unsecured creditors have under state law to
avoid transfers made and obligations incurred by the debtor. That
power must derive from actual creditors. The bankruptcy court's
decision on the trustee's standing in In re Allou Distributors
demonstrates how the trustee's powers can be unduly limited or
expanded when a court does not strictly follow the derivative nature of
§ 544(b). Ironically, a consideration of the rights of future creditors
under applicable state fraudulent conveyance laws would have led to the
same conclusion on the trustee's standing as that reached by the court.
The stipulated facts established that the debtor had unreasonably small
capital at the time that it made the transfer to the defendant so that any
creditor holding a claim arising before the bankruptcy filing could have
served as the triggering creditor under § 544(b). However, the decision
did not follow that path. Unfortunately, the decision also appears to
have left the door open for a trustee, under § 544(b), to recover a
fraudulent conveyance made by an insolvent debtor when the triggering
creditor, because of a valid defense, would not have had the ability to
avoid the transfer at the time of the bankruptcy case.

